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This commit is contained in:
Hongbo Wu
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"dir": null,
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"excerpt": "Centralized campaigns of inspiration; Proust; rejecting complacency and decadence; the pandemic in Beijing; brown sauce; riding a bike; rejuvenation.",
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"siteName": "Dan Wang",
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"siteIcon": "https://danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/dan-wang-shopify12.png",
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"previewImage": "https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?fit=700%2C1044&ssl=1",
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"publishedDate": "2021-01-01T15:44:10.000Z",
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"language": "English",
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"readerable": true
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}
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<DIV class="page" id="readability-page-1">
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<div id="page" role="main">
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<article id="post-1569">
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<p> When it’s not being vague, the party can be trying to have things both ways. Xi declared at the third plenum in 2013 that market forces would have a “decisive” role in allocating resources, while at the same time the state sector would have a “leading” role. It’s not unusual to see a great deal of semantic acrobatics. Deng declared that socialism means the capacity to concentrate resources to accomplish great tasks; under that definition, the Apollo and Manhattan projects were socialism. In July, Xi reminded us that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has many distinctive features, but its most essential is leadership by the Chinese Communist Party.” </p>
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<p>In other words, socialism with Chinese characteristics means the party is never wrong. Either the market or the state sector can be more important at any moment: it is the party’s pleasure to decide. </p>
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<p> Centralized campaigns of inspiration, which usually manifests through fixing slogans, is a distinctive feature of the Chinese political system. In the US, political candidates trot out slogans when they run for election; in China, one is never far from the next big named initiative. At its best, defining major goals is the essence of political leadership, and nowhere is this principle better illustrated than Apollo. John F. Kennedy announced the target in 1961: land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth before the decade was out. By fixing this clear goal, </p>
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<p>as well as committing the necessary spending, he accelerated the creation, development, and deployment of technologies that made the lunar landings possible. </p>
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<p>as well as committing the necessary spending, he accelerated the creation, development, and deployment of technologies that made the lunar landings possible.</p>
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<p> Xi grasps this idea of leadership. In his tenure, he has unleashed a torrent of new initiatives. In my view, he feels that the practice of governing China under socialism cannot be an exercise in sustained mendacity. The political system can no longer continue to be an unstable structure based on ad hoc compromises; instead it must have a clear organizational structure, with the party at the top. And the ruling party needs to have the political consciousness of an effective governing force. </p>
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<p> Consider two of his most important initiatives: the campaign against corruption and the move toward law-based governance. Xi has decided that corruption is not a mystery to be endured, but a problem to be solved. A few years past the peak of the crackdown, it’s fair to say that the campaign hasn’t solely been effective in removing his adversaries, but has also been broad enough to restore some degree of public confidence in government. A few commentators contend that removal of opportunities for graft have prompted talented people to leave government. But the flip side of that coin has been the improvement in morale among the civil servants who found corruption among colleagues to be intolerable, and can finally see themselves doing public work well. </p>
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<p> And for years, Xi has emphasized following clear rules of written procedure, under the rubric of “law-based governance.” </p>
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<p> Given the importance of the slogan, it’s worthwhile to try to come to terms with the fondness and reverence his generation has for the party’s early days. Many of the people tormented by the party center, including Deng and Xi’s father, have ended up being fiercely loyal to the party. </p>
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<p>That shows not just that human nature is complex, but also that the revolutionary heritage of the party instills pride. The CCP started out as a combat party constantly at the mercy of forces grander than itself, achieving its goals after an unusually long struggle that repeatedly brought it to the brink of death. Daniel Koss reminds us that the longer that revolutionary parties have to struggle before consolidating power, the more stronger their ideological commitments and the greater their governance durability tend to be. </p>
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<p> Xi is keen to reflect upon the regime’s history. He has decided that the party must believe in itself, and that it is correct to do so: “If our Party members and officials are firm in their ideals and convictions and maintain high morale in their activities and initiatives, and if our people are high-spirited and determined, then we will surely create many miracles.” </p>
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<p>Furthermore, he has stated: “The prospects are bright but the challenges are severe. All comrades must aim high and look far, be alert to dangers even in times of calm, have the courage to pursue reform and break new ground, and never become hardened to change.” </p>
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<p>Furthermore, he has stated: “The prospects are bright but the challenges are severe. All comrades must aim high and look far, be alert to dangers even in times of calm, have the courage to pursue reform and break new ground, and never become hardened to change.”</p>
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<p> Thus I’ve arrived at the idea that a commitment to centralized campaigns of inspiration, represented by the tendency to fix clear goals, is the booster stage required to leave the gravitational pull of decadence and complacency. Ross Douthat laments that “a consistent ineffectuality in American governance is just the way things are.” </p>
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<p>And he references Jacques Barzun, who defines a decadent society as one that is “peculiarly restless, for it sees no clear lines of advance.” As a society turns developed, its main problems become social: an organizational sclerosis, which no technology is sophisticated enough to solve. No great effort is required to identify the comprehensive paralysis in the US. And that is the political and social current that Xi is trying to reverse in China. </p>
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<p> One way to do that is to continue to pursue GDP growth, which has mostly become an unfashionable idea today in the west. Xi reminded the state in July that “economic work must be our core task, if we succeed in that, then the rest of our tasks become easy.” </p>
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<p>Barry Naughton has noted that “China’s system of incentives for local bureaucrats to encourage growth is extremely unusual, and seems only to exist in China. It is a blunt and powerful instrument.” </p>
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<p>Barry Naughton has noted that “China’s system of incentives for local bureaucrats to encourage growth is extremely unusual, and seems only to exist in China. It is a blunt and powerful instrument.”</p>
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<p> This emphasis on growth makes it less likely for China to develop into American complacency or decadence. There are other types of paralysis that it stands a good chance of avoiding. With its emphasis on the real economy, it is trying to avoid the fate of Hong Kong, where local elites have reorganized the productive forces completely around sustaining high property prices and managing mainland liquidity flows. With its emphasis on economic growth, it cannot be like Taiwan, whose single bright corporate beacon is surrounded by a mass of firms undergoing genteel decline. With its emphasis on manufacturing, it cannot be like the UK, which is so successful in the sounding-clever industries—television, journalism, finance, and universities—while seeing a falling share of R&D intensity and a global loss of standing among its largest firms. </p>
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<p> Douthat’s book does not deal seriously with China, only with a fantasy of a universally-surveilled society under the rubric of a social credit system. If he did engage more seriously, he might pick up what Frank Pieke has termed “neo-socialism,” which is the attempt to harness market liberalization to strengthen state capacity and a more Leninist party. </p>
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<p>In return, the state provides purpose and direction, as well as inspiring the rest of society with a transformative mission. It helps, of course, that Xi is a genuine believer in socialism, which to him is both an instrument as well as an end. He’s leveraging that belief to reject decadence and assert agency to point out new lines of advance. </p>
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<p> That was quite a lot of theory. Where does it fall apart? </p>
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<p> Xi has said: “If we turn a blind eye to challenges, or even dodge or disguise them; if we fear to advance in the face of challenges and sit by and watch the unfolding calamity; then they will grow beyond our control and cause irreparable damage.” </p>
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<p>Instead of heeding this warning, authorities in Wuhan suppressed reporting of a spread of a novel virus. At a time when they should have imposed restrictions, they congregated thousands around a gigantic potluck. That has indeed unfolded into a calamity. </p>
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<p> Xi has said<strong>:</strong> “Some officials are perfunctory in their work, shirking responsibility when troubles come and dodging thorny problems. They like to report every trifle to their superiors for approval or directives. In doing so, they appear to be abiding by the rules but are actually avoiding responsibilities. Some make ill-considered or purely arbitrary decisions. They place themselves above the party organization and allow no dissenting voices.” </p>
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<p> But as economic growth slows down, the country is doubling down on centralized government. Over the last several years, the state is taking more of a leading role in the economy, which means a larger role for bureaucrats. </p>
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<p> Xi has said<strong>:</strong> “Some officials are perfunctory in their work, shirking responsibility when troubles come and dodging thorny problems. They like to report every trifle to their superiors for approval or directives. In doing so, they appear to be abiding by the rules but are actually avoiding responsibilities. Some make ill-considered or purely arbitrary decisions. They place themselves above the party organization and allow no dissenting voices.” </p> <p>But as economic growth slows down, the country is doubling down on centralized government. Over the last several years, the state is taking more of a leading role in the economy, which means a larger role for bureaucrats. </p>
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<p> Xi has said: “Self-criticism needs to be specific about our problems and needs to touch underlying questions… We must be gratified when told of our errors; we must not shy away from our shortcomings. We must accommodate different opinions and sharp criticism.” </p>
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<p>When medical professionals spoke up about a strange new virus circulating in Wuhan, police gave them reprimands. More and more often, the state is simply arresting critics. Even though the government has every reason to be confident about the effectiveness of its virus containment, it has issued a jail sentence to a citizen journalist under the catch-all charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” For all the emphasis on seeking truth from facts, the state still maintains this practice of shooting the messenger or jailing its critics. </p>
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<p> On its own terms, the party center’s instruction is unevenly followed. And there are plenty of reasons to doubt the sustainability of Chinese growth that exist beyond the party’s capacity for self-reform. The following have all received extensive treatment: demographics will be a clear and serious drag in only a few years; an uncomfortable buildup of debt is now accompanied by growing investor discomfort with strategic defaults; the environment is bearing greater stresses; and based on the state’s aggression abroad and the operation of detention camps for minority groups at home, the rest of the world has become much less friendly towards China. One can add more items here, I want to consider the problems with centralized campaigns of inspiration. </p>
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<p> In the early months of the pandemic, I picked up a new skill: riding a bike. I’ve always been mortified to admit that I never properly knew how. With the encouragement of kind and patient friends, I’ve enjoyed cycling so much that it has become the primary way I get around Beijing. The city is good for cyclists, with its wide bicycle paths and flat roads. (Given the behavior of most drivers though, Beijing requires taking seriously the principle of safety first.) My favorite activity has become to cycle to the Forbidden City and back home, a nice hour-long ride that I would do after lunch. I’m still enjoying the feeling of gliding down a road on my own propulsion, which gives me a sense of slight unreality. That’s been good for thinking: I wrote significant chunks of this letter while riding down Beijing’s second and fourth ring roads. </p>
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<p> This year marks my seventh of not drinking. I expect that I’m in the best shape of my life, given that, regular bike rides, occasional badminton sessions, and working out with my personal trainer three times a week. Still, I’m exhausted. That doesn’t mean it’s time to slow down. There are too many interesting things left to do. </p>
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<figure>
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<a href="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?ssl=1"><img loading="lazy" width="1000" height="1492" src="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?fit=700%2C1044&ssl=1" alt="" srcset="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?w=1000&ssl=1 1000w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=465%2C694&ssl=1 465w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=700%2C1044&ssl=1 700w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=768%2C1146&ssl=1 768w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=940%2C1402&ssl=1 940w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=200%2C298&ssl=1 200w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px"></a>
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<a href="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?ssl=1"><img loading="lazy" width="1000" height="1492" src="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?fit=700%2C1044&ssl=1" alt="" srcset="https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?w=1000&ssl=1 1000w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=465%2C694&ssl=1 465w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=700%2C1044&ssl=1 700w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=768%2C1146&ssl=1 768w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=940%2C1402&ssl=1 940w, https://i1.wp.com/danwang.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nasa-titan.jpg?resize=200%2C298&ssl=1 200w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px"></a>
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</figure>
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<p>
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<em>Titan, a planet-sized moon of Saturn, has a thick atmosphere and liquid oceans. It and Europa—one of the moons of Jupiter, which might have warm liquid oceans—offer the best chances of discovering extraterrestrial life in our solar system. Credit:</em> <a href="https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/visions-of-the-future/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>JPL</em></a>
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<p> see Anne-Marie Brady: Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China<a href="#note-1-1569">↩</a>
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<p> 中国特色社会主义有很多特点和特征，但最本质的特征是坚持中国共产党领导。http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-07/15/c_1126234524.htm<a href="#note-2-1569">↩</a>
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<p> For more, see Charles Fishman’s excellent One Giant Leap, which showed how NASA had to invent a thousand and one technologies to reach the moon <a href="#note-3-1569">↩</a>
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<p> Sometimes translated as “rule of law”: 依法治国<a href="#note-4-1569">↩</a>
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<p>
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<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/07/c_139120424.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/07/c_139120424.htm</a><a href="#note-5-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see Dan Grover on the UI changes that Chinese apps made: http://dangrover.com/blog/2020/04/05/covid-in-ui.html<a href="#note-6-1569">↩</a>
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<p> That’s a broad and unfair generalization, I know. This Economist leader offers a more nuanced view: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/08/15/xi-jinping-is-trying-to-remake-the-chinese-economy<a href="#note-7-1569">↩</a>
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<p> This is my translation of 不忘初心、牢记使命. There are variations on the third line, I included one I’ve seen: 永远奋斗 <a href="#note-8-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see this excellent discussion between Frederick Teiwes and Joseph Torigian https://omny.fm/shows/the-little-red-podcast/xi-dada-and-daddy-power-the-party-and-the-presiden<a href="#note-9-1569">↩</a>
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<p> From Dialectical Materialism Is the Worldview and Methodology of Chinese Communists, 广大党员、干部理想信念坚定、干事创业精气神足，人民群众精神振奋、发愤图强，就可以创造出很多人间奇迹 http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2018-12/31/c_1123923896.htm<a href="#note-10-1569">↩</a>
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<p> Report to the 19th party congress: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf<a href="#note-11-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see The Decadent Society<a href="#note-12-1569">↩</a>
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<p> 经济工作是中心工作，党的领导当然要在中心工作中得到充分体现，抓住了中心工作这个牛鼻子，其他工作就可以更好展开。http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-07/15/c_1126234524.htm<a href="#note-13-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see Frank Pieke’s Knowing China<a href="#note-14-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see Dialectical Materialism Is the Worldview and Methodology of Chinese Communists 如果对矛盾熟视无睹，甚至回避、掩饰矛盾，在矛盾面前畏缩不前，坐看矛盾恶性转化，那就会积重难返，最后势必造成无法弥补的损失。 http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2018-12/31/c_1123923896.htm<a href="#note-15-1569">↩</a>
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<p> from the speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection<a href="#note-16-1569">↩</a>
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<p> from Goals of the Aspiration and Mission Education Campaign, May 31 2019<a href="#note-17-1569">↩</a>
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<p> http://www.chinafilm.gov.cn/chinafilm/contents/141/2533.shtml<a href="#note-18-1569">↩</a>
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<p> Wang Hongsheng, a boss at Jinghai, admits to fretting about interruptions to chick supplies, even wondering if President Donald Trump might curb American exports. https://www.economist.com/china/2020/10/31/high-tech-chickens-are-a-case-study-of-why-self-reliance-is-so-hard<a href="#note-19-1569">↩</a>
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<p> see this WSJ story https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-vs-china-the-high-cost-of-the-technology-cold-war-11603397438 and Doug Fuller’s claim on Tokyo Electron https://www.jhuapl.edu/assessing-us-china-technology-connections/publications<a href="#note-20-1569">↩</a>
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<p> This is admittedly a bit of my own fanciful translation of 必须看到，实体经济是基础，各种制造业不能丢，作为14亿人口的大国，粮食和实体产业要以自己为主，这一条绝对不能丢 http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-10/31/c_1126680390.htm<a href="#note-21-1569">↩</a>
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